We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply. (JEL D72, D74, O17, O18, R12)

• Capitais distantes colaboram com corrupção, aponta estudo (Distant capitals collaborate with corruption, study points out) O Globo, May 25, 2013
• Myanmar’s Phantom Capital: Why did Myanmar’s generals build a new capital in the middle of nowhere? The Globalist, Sep 28, 2012
• Rural Capitals, Big-Time Problems New York Times, Sep 09, 2014
• Violent protests and distant leaders AEA Web, Jul 29, 2019